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Due to the confusion concerning the state of the law regarding artificial
nutrition and hydration, we propose to review some of the significant legal
opinions and to outline some of the possible options for Catholic health
care facilities in attempting to respond to the legal and ethical dimensions
involved.
Until just a few short years ago, the mere suggestion, much less the actual
act, of discontinuing the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration to a
hospital patient would have sent shock waves through the medical and legal
communities. This reaction was understandable because the provision of
artificial nutrition and hydration was regarded not as just another
treatment modality, but as basic, non-negotiable comfort care which would
'
be provided as long as the patient was alive.
The movement away from artificial nourishment accelerated when
Barber vs. Superior Court was decided in 1983. J This case involved two Los
Angeles physicians who were being prosecuted for murder because they
withdrew the artificial nutrition and hydration from a comatose adult
patient, Clarence Herbert. In the appeal decision which exonerated the
physicians, the justices refused to distinguish between artificial nutrition
and hydration and artificial breathing or ventilator support:
Medical nutrition and hydration may not always provide net benefits to patients.
Medical procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are more simi lar to other
medical procedures than to typical human ways of providing nutrition and
hydration . Their benefits and burdens ought to be evaluated in the same manner as
any other medical procedure.'

The standard to be applied to evaluate the benefits and burdens of
medical procedures including artificial nutrition and hydration, according
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to the Barber decision. is whether the continued treatment is proportionate
or disproportionate to the patient's recovery to cognitive and sapient life:
Proportionate treatment is that which. in view of th e patient has at leas t a
reasonable chance of providing bene fits to th e patient. w hich be nefits outweigh
the burdens attendant to the treatme nt. )

The court continues:.
A treatment course which is onlv minimally painful or intrusive ma y nonetheless
be considered disproportionate to the potential benefit s if the prognosis is
virtua ll y hopeless for any significant improvement in condit ion."

In 1984. while not directly addressing nutrition and hydration. the
California Court of Appeals in the Bartling decision extended the right to
refuse disproportionate treatment to a competent. non-comatose adult 5
This case was brought by the patient's wife who was seeking a court order
to have the hospital remove a n artificial breathing device. The court held
that the right to refuse treatment was based on the constitutiona l right of
privacy and was. in thi s case. superior to the interests of the state in
preserving life. protection of innocent third parties. prevention of suicide
and the preservation of the ethical int egrity of the medical profession.
In 1985. the Supreme Court of New Jerse y. the same court that decided
the Karen Ann Quinlan case. in the Maffer of" Conror . directly addressed
the issue of artificial nutrition and hydration in an incompetent. noncomatose patient. 6 This court approved the foregoing of art ificial feed ing
from Claire Conroy. an 84-year old bedridden woman who was
incompetent. institutionalized with severe a nd permanent mental and
physical impairments and had a limited life expectancy. The Barher.
Bartling. and Conrot' cases laid the groundwork fora 1986case. BOllI'ia 1'.1'.
Superior Court . which put an end to the rationale that artific ial nutrition
and hydration were non-negotiable comfort care l

The Bouvia Case
Eli zabeth Bouvia is a competent . non-comatose ad ult. She is a cerebral
palsy victim who has been a quadriplegic since birth. She has been married
and divorced. was pregnant but suffered a miscarriage. Three years ago.
while in a Riverside. California hospital. she sought a court order directing
the hospital to withdraw her artificial nutrition and hydration . and to keep
her comfortable while she starved herself to death. The court refused to
grant such an order and Ms. Bouvia eventually left the hospital. She lived
with family and friends until December. 1985 when she was admitted to a
Los Angeles County Medical Facility. While there her weight dropped and
artificial nourishment was begun without Ms. Bouvia's consent because
her condition was judged to be life-threatening by the physicians. She
again went to court, but this time asked for an order to withdraw art ificial
nutrition and hydration in order to be relieved of the burden of that
treatment. She denied that she wa s again intent upon suicide and stated
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that she would take liquids normally if the artificial measures were
discontinued. The trial court did not believe Ms. Bouvia and refused to
grant her requested order. Ms. Bouvia appealed that decision.
On April 16, 1986. the California Court of Appeal reversed the decision
of the trial court. stating that a competent adult patient has the right to
refuse any medical treatment or medical service, even when such treatment
is labeled "furnishing nourishment and hydration" and even if its exercise
creates a "life threatening condition."x Calling this right to refuse medical
treatment "basic and fundamental" and "part of the right of privacy
protected by both the state and federal constitutions" , the appellate court
ruled that it "requires no one's approval" and is not "subject to being
overridden by medical opinion". This court further ruled that a
"constitutionally guaranteed right must not be abridged" and that "it
matters not what its exercise".
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Compton joined in the
majority decision but, unlike the majority, directly addressed the issue of
suicide .9 After observing tha t the majority opinion danced around the
issue , Justice Compton stated that the " right to die is an integral part of our
right to control our own destinies so long as the rights of others are not
affected" . He further added that this right should "include the ability to
enlist assistance from others , including the medical profession, in making
death as painless and quick as possible".
This decision stunned not only the medical community but others
including the County of Los Angeles which petitioned the California
Supreme Court to review the case and to stay the decision pending the
review. The Supreme Court , on June 5, 1986, refused to review the case
and thereby let the decision stand .
The above review of some recent court cases indicates the complex
assessment of values which enters into the legal appraisal of withdrawal of
medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration . Entering
into this assessment are such concerns and "proportiop ate or disproportionate care", the value of patient autonomy, and legitimate state
interests concerning the protection of human life . From a Catholic moral
perspective, it is important to offer some reflections on these legal
developments .
The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means have enjoyed a long
provenance in the ethical literature . However, there is an inescapable
ambiguity inherent in the terms since consideration of perspective
influences the extent to which medical treatments are deemed " ordinary"
or " extraordinary". For example, from one perspective , namely the
physician's, "ordinary" means are those dictated by the state of current
technology. From the patient's perspective, however, a different
perception can emerge. That is, "ordinary" means would constitute those
measures which are minimally invasive and confer some discernible
benefit irrespective of technical merit. Classically, the distinction between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means has been elaborated from the
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viewpoint of the patient on the basi s ofa " benefit- burden" test , that is, if
the treatment does not confer a discernible benefit to the patient , or results
in intolerable burden, the treatment may be refusable or "optional" and
hence , "extraordinary".

Adoption of Terms
In order to obviate some of the confusion surrounding the terms
"ordinary" and "extra·o rdinary", practitioners of ethics have adopted the
terms "proportionate" and "disproportionate." This terminology appears
not only in the Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia (1980), but also in the
President's Commission Report, DecidinK to Forego LiFe-Sustaining
Treatment (March, 1983).1 0 Discerning the proper "proportion" or
" measure" of treatment requires careful ethical judgment in order to make
the appropriate decisions about continuing or foregoing treatment. The
me rit of thi s la ng uage is that it focuses attention on the patient's total
condition in order to assess whether treatment is obligatory or optional. If
the treatme nt isjudged to be "di spro portiona te" and hence optional, there
is no obligation to continue the treatme nt. Moralists Kevin O'Rourke a nd
Dennis Brod e ur highlight thi s point:
If th e mea ns arc determined from an ethi ca l point of view to be ex traordinary
[i.e .. disproportionate]. they mayor may no t be e mployed. "

In a recent statement publi shed by the Committee for Pro-Life
Activities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, this perspective
was held to be in keeping with the Church's moral tradition :
We maintain that o ne is obliged t o use ··ordinary" means of preserving life- tha t
is. means whi c h ca n c1Tectively prese rve life wit hout impo sing g ra ve burd e ns on
the patient and we see the failure to sup pl y suc h means as "equivalent to
eut hanasia" .
But we also recognize a nd defend a patient's right to refuse
"ex tra ordi na ry'· means - that is. mea ns which provide no benefit or which
in vol ve too gra ve a burden."

We judge that these criteria provide so me helpful gu idance for the
difficult questions concerning artificial nutrition and hydration , as well as
the complex questions concerning withdra wal of life support prese nted by
the Bouvia case.
Rather than focusing on the tec hnology of artificial nutrition and
hydratio n, we s uggest that it may be more helpful to focus on the pa tient in
order to determine whether or not the provision of artificial nutrition and
hydrat ion co nstitutes a burden or a benefit for the patient. The Christian
notion of stewards hip recogni zes our responsibility to make reasonable
provision for our ph ysical , emotional and spiritual needs. Moreover, the
notion of being a good "steward" implicitly recognizes that there are limits
to the stewa rd s hip of our bodies. To make thi s claim is not to endorse an
in strume nta l o r utilitarian view of the body, but rather to recognize that
bod il y life may not be well served by secu ring its maintenance at the cost of
o th er huma n good s. That is, at times we may find ourselves not in the
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position of prolonging life, but rather of prolonging the dying process.
Under most circumstances, provision of artificial feeding and hydration
will be given in order to express our commitment to the good of the patient
and as an expression of our commitment to the symbolic value of
nourishment as an expression of our obligations to care for human life.
However, there may be some circumstances which call for a different
assessment. For example, the patient who experiences great pain and
discomfort with the feeding tube, or the terminally ill person who
invariably becomes anorexic as the disease process takes its toll , or the
patient whose protracted and irreversible coma offers no hope for any
prognosis of recovery, can conceivably be viewed as nOI benefitting from
the provision of artificial nourishment.
Explanation of Circumstances
It seems to us that a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of
"ordinary" or "proportionate" measures dictates the removal of the
feeding tube when the circumstances have rendered it "extraordinary" or
"disproportionate". The presence of pain or discomfort is not sufficient in
and of itself to constitute such justifying circumstances. The criterion of
"burden" to the patient must be such that in the particular circumstances
of the patient, life's goals are no longer reasonably attainable. We judge
that Father Kevin O'Rourke has captured this dimension well in his recent
remarks:
One of the basic ethical assumptions upon which medicine and all efforts to nurse
and feed people is based is that there is an obligation to prolong life because living
enables us to pursue the purpose of life. Does this obligation ever cease? Clearly, it
would cease if prolonging life no longer enables one to strive for the purpose of
life. If efforts to prolong life are useless insofar as pursuing the purpose of life is
concerned, or if prolonging life results in a severe burden for the patient insofar as
pursuing the puroose of life is concerned. then the ethical obligation to prolong
life is no longer present. 13

A similar perspective can be seen in a recent statement p'ublished by the
Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops:
We maintain that one is obliged to use "ordinary" means of preserving life, that is,
means which can effectively preserve life without imposing grave burdens on the
patient, and we see the failure to provide such means as "equivalent to
euthanasia" . . . But we also recognize and defend a patient's right to refuse
"extraordinary" means, that is means which provide no benefit or which involve
too grave a burden."

Father O'Rourke further specifies the application of these principles to
the question of tube feeding, by appealing to the classic moral notion that
"nemo tenetur ad inutile," that is, "No one is obliged to useless means"
concerning medical treatment. The notion of "burden" is an important
consideration, but in the case of irreversible coma , the notion that the
treatment is "useless" due to loss of cognitive function, is more significant.
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To pursue the purpose of life , one needs some degree of cognitive-affective
function . Hence, if efforts to restore or develop cognitive-affective function can
be judged useless and a fatal pathology is present , the person may be allowed to
die because prolonging life would not enable the individual to strive for the
purpose of life. ls

It is clear that careful , prudent judgment is necessary concerning the
issue of artificial nutrition and hydration . Withdrawal of treatment , as the
citation from the Committee for Pro-Life Activities indicates, must not
cross the line into endorsement of euthanasia. A particular aspect of recent
court cases, notably Bouvia. is the alarming tendency to inflate the notion
of patient autonomy to encompass a suicidal intent. This interpretation is
clearly evident in the concurring opinion offered by Judge Compton in the
ruling of the appellate court.
From an ethical point of view , autonomy is a crucial moral principle
governing treatment decisions which respects the capacity for selfdirection inherent in the dignity of the individual patient. However, it
seems to us that the construction of patient autonomy to include the
capacity to inflict harm on oneself, and to include caregivers and health
care providers in the provision of such harm , erodes the very meaning of
patient autonomy into a notion of individual preference without
appropriate checks and balances.
View of Patient Autonomy
At the very least, patient autonomy must be seen within the context of
proper stewardship of the gift of life . While it is often difficult to know
where to "draw the line" concerning decisions to with old or withdraw
treatment, it seems to us that Judge Compton's view clearly crosses the line
into euthanasia and endorsement of suicide. If such a view prevails ,
implications for societal well-being are indeed grave. Catholic health care
providers should be careful to attend to both the legal and moral
dimensions of judicial decisions such as Bouvia.
,
The Archbishop of Los Angeles , Roger Mahony, released a strong
statement on the Bouvia ruling and its alarming "invitations to
euthanasia".16 This statement, quite rightly, pointed out that the standard
of determining the level of medical care provided should be the quality and
proportionality of the treatment. not the life of the patient. It is morally
acceptable to refuse treatment. including food , if that treatment "is a
source of significant pain , discomfort , risk or even dehumanization added
to what is already being experienced" .1 7
On balance, then , we think that the question of foregoing artificial
nutrition and hydration requires careful and prudential assessment. The
quest for an absolute position on these measures beyond the traditional
categories of " ordinary" or "extraordinary" means which invite persuasive
moral argument is illusory and self-defeating. Father Richard McCormick
S.J. , in his thoughtful essay on this topic, cautions that there is a great
potential for abuse of the patient when considering the withdrawal of
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artificial nourishment. Accordingly, we should err, if possible, on the side
of life. I S
What are the implications of this discussion for hospitals , especially
Catholic facilities? Because of the legal and moral complexities , each case
must be decided on its merits with the help oflegal and moral counsel when
necessary. With this caveat in mind, the policy for providing or foregoing
treatment must be consistent with both the applicable law within the
hospital's jurisdiction and the moral principles of the institution. For
example , since we are writing from the perspective of recent litigation in
Southern California, some general treatment guidelines for consenting
adult patients may look like the following:
1. Providing ordinary care is legally and morally acceptable.
2. Foregoing ordinary care in order to avoid the burden of the
treatment is legally acceptable but morally unacceptable.
3. Foregoing ordinary care in order to avoid the burden of one's life is
legally acceptable but morally unacceptable.
4. Foregoing ordinary care in order to end one's life is legally uncertain
and morally unacceptable.
5. Providing extraordinary care is legally and morally acceptable.
6 . Foregoing extraordinary care in order to avoid the burden of the
treatment is legally and morally acceptable.
7. Foregoing extraordinary care in order to avoid the burden of one's
life is legally acceptable but morally unacceptable.
8. Foregoing extraordinary care in order to end one's life is legally
uncertain and morally unacceptable.
On the basis of the Bouvia decision , we make a distinction between the
intent to avoid the burden of one's life (3 and 7) , and the intent to end one's
life (4 and 8). The majority opinion clearly held that the former is legally
acceptable. How the former is distinguishable from the latter was not,
however, as clear. As mentioned above , Justice Compton quite accurately
described the majority opinion as dancing around the issue' of suicide, and
by doing so, left those of us facing these issues in our hospitals on uncertain
legal ground.
In the face of what promises to be a situation of continuing conflicts and
some uncertainty, we wish to underscore our position that treatment
decisions must be both legally and morally acceptable. Those of us in
Catholic health care are no strangers to conflict in this area. It has long
been legally acceptable to have an abortion or sterilization procedure , but
because these treatments are not morally acceptable to us, we do not
perform them. A similar position may have to be taken in regard to
artificial nutrition and hydration if presented with a factual situation
comparable to that which provided the basis for the decision in the Bouvia
case. While there may be some circumstances which call for the removal of
artificial nutrition and hydration in patients with a fatal pathology (as
Father O'Rourke carefully points out) , we conclude that these
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circumstances do not include the unwarranted intention of suicide
apparent in the Bouvia decision .
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